On October 8, shortly after the Hamas attacks on Israel, I wrote an article entitled, “Something’s Not Right About The Israel/Hamas War – Could It Lead To Genocide, World War Three?” In that article, I discussed how the official Israeli story, as well as the official Hamas story, simply did not seem to add up. Claims that Hamas, with its deep roots to Israeli intelligence, independently outwitted the Israeli intelligence apparatus in one of the most surveilled areas of the world seemed ominously similar to American claims that Osama bin Laden masterminded the 9/11 attacks from a cave in Afghanistan.
Indeed, in that article I wrote:
Gaza is one of the most surveilled areas of the world. The Israelis are exceptionally good at intelligence gathering and putting that intelligence to use and yet we are supposed to believe there were not enough Israeli intelligence agents on the ground in Palestinian territory to catch wind of such a monumental operation? Anyone who understands geopolitics and has been to the Middle East knows well how powerful and effective Israeli intelligence is in the region.
But, while it may be possible that Hamas did outwit the Israeli intelligence apparatus by using more rudimentary methods of communication, how do we know this now? How did we know the next day? Did Hamas announce its methods or did Israel discover it 24 hours too late? This explanation seems all too neatly sewn and all too quickly delivered to be entirely believable.
Indeed, the attack was able to deliver losses to the Israeli military in direct combat, missiles got past the Iron Dome, and ships escaped discovery. None of these losses are such that the Israeli military is crippled or even damaged beyond a potential perception of weakness but it was all theatrical enough and horrendous enough for civilians to experience that it has been useful to instill fear in the population.
Is it possible that Israel did, in fact, know about the plans to attack before they happened and that the Israeli government allowed it to happen for some reason or other? Is it also possible that the Israelis worked with Hamas to do so?
A recent article by the New York Times entitled “Israel Knew Hamas’ Attack Plan More Than A Year Ago,” by Ronan Bergman and Adam Goldman has revealed clear evidence that my questions were well placed. Israel did, in fact, know about the Hamas plan in detail long before it ever took place.
Bergman and Goldman write:
Israeli officials obtained Hamas’ battle plan for the Oct. 7 terrorist attack more than a year before it happened, documents, emails and interviews show. But Israeli military and intelligence officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, considering it too difficult for Hamas to carry out.
The approximately 40-page document, which Israeli authorities code-named “Jericho Wall,” outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people.
The translated document, which was reviewed by The New York Times, did not set a date for the attack, but described a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.
Hamas followed the blueprint with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot — all of which happened Oct. 7.
The plan also included details about the location and size of Israeli military forces, communication hubs and other sensitive information, raising questions about how Hamas gathered its intelligence and whether there were leaks inside the Israeli security establishment.
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’ capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said Hamas’ intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by the Times.