With absolutely no fanfare in either the alternative or mainstream media, veteran journalist Seymour Hersh has released a leaked Pentagon/DIA assessment of the chemical warfare capability of Jobhat al-Nusra/Al-Nusra Front (also known as Al-Qaeda), a fact that Western governments and Western media simply would not admit during their “chemical weapons” propaganda volley against the Syrian government. The document is from June 20, 2013.
The documents were released in Hersh’s article entitled “When the Intelligence is Inconvenient” and can be found on his Substack page. The entire article can be read in full with a subscription.
A brief excerpt from the article reads:
On Sunday Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Jonathan Karl of ABC’s This Week that he remained “very confident in Ukraine’s ultimate success” in the ongoing war with Russia. He depicted Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision to escalate its attacks inside Russia as “their decision, not ours.”
Blinken’s wrong-headed confidence and his acceptance of a significant escalation in the Ukraine war defies belief, given the reality on the ground today in the war. But it also could be based on insanely optimistic assessments supplied by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA’s assessments, as I have reported, are now the intelligence of choice inside the White House.
As a journalist who has written about national security matters for many decades, how can I explain a process that is clearly contrary to the best interests of the people of the United States and its leadership?
More importantly than Hersh’s quotes, however, are the quotes from the DIA assessment itself.
The al-Nusrah Front associated sarin production cell is the most advanced sarin plot since al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 effort. Arrests in Iraq and Turkey have disrupted the cell’s operations; however we assess the intent to produce advanced chemical weapons (CW) remains. Previous IC focus had been almost entirely on Syrian CW stockpiles; now we seen ANF attempting to make its own CW.
. . . . .
To continue with a sarin effort they will need to recruit scientific expertise. Less difficult will be obtaining needed chemicals; Ghani has a chemical facilitation route already.
. . . . .
Al-Nusrah’s relative freedom of operation within Syria leads us to assess the group’s CW aspirations will be difficult to disrupt in the future.