On 1 December, The UK’s Department of Health and Social Care published the Technical Report on the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK.
The report is a long 11-chapter document describing the UK’s response and pointing out suggestions for dealing with future pandemics.
The report is dubbed “independent,” but the authors are public health civil servants and a handful of academics. Given that the authors were instrumental to a greater and lesser degree in implementing the catastrophes of lockdowns, the content is as independent as President Xi’s assessment of his policies.
Readers of Trust the Evidence will face problems reconciling some of the report content with what we have written. For example, there is no mention of the misuse of PCR or the failure to follow closely other nations ahead of the curve whose contact tracing systems had been overwhelmed in days.
It was important – and the UK did not always get this right – to align testing aims, use cases, technologies, data flows and communications in coherent testing strategies.
Department of Health and Social Care: Independent Report, Chapter 6: testing, Reflections and advice for a future CMO or GCSA, Point 2, 1 December 2022
There is no apology for the evidence-free mass testing, the segregation of healthy people and the lack of identification of truly infectious cases.
Pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission, in the absence of routine mass asymptomatic testing, are a huge challenge for even a highly effective contact tracing system.
Department of Health and Social Care: Independent Report, Chapter 7: contact tracing and isolation, Reflections and advice for a future CMO or GCSA, Point 2, 1 December 2022
A better wording might have been: contact tracing is hugely challenging, and it won’t achieve its intended outcomes and was, therefore, a waste of £37 billion – something the Lombardy public health operators had realised by the beginning of March 2020 and the UK Parliament considered was an ‘unimaginable’ cost.